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**SOCIAL NATURE OF INFORMBUREAU (KOMINFORMIST) MOVEMENT IN THE YUGOSLAVIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY**

**Summary.** The article discusses assessments that Yugoslav historians gave to kominformist movement. The evolution of the estimations was studied, it was shown that the version of kominformists as the Soviet secret police agents was unfounded. Recent studies have shown that kominformist movement was the result of social processes in Yugoslavia, and the degree of its development depended on the national and cultural characteristics of individual regions.

**Key words:** Yugoslavia, kominformists, social composition, political struggle, historiography.

The members of informbureau movement are Stalin’s and USSR’s adherents, who worked in Yugoslavia at the period of soviet-yugoslavian conflict of 1948-1955. Their fate often attracts more attention in the former Yugoslavia, and is paid lot less interest on the post-soviet area. It was written just a little about the members of informbureau movement up to now. In 1990 was written a popular article by G. Polegaeva[1, С. 34-41], a short reference material about them was given in Y. S. Gyrenko’s , N.V. Vasyl’eva’s and V.A. Gavrilov’s books [2, С. 391-392; 3, С. 248; 4, С. 290-291], a small section focusesonthe members of informbureau movement in monograph “Moscow and Eastern Europe” [5, C. 587-591], and there are few publications on specific issues by E. U. Gus’kova[6, C. 471-475 ]. Moreover, the small characteristic of the informbureau movement was given a few years ago by the author of this article in the monograph on the history of Yugoslavia, and that’s practically all historiography. The literature about the informbureau movement is highly vast in Yugoslavia and in countries formed on its place. But it has one remarkable feature: the accent is made not on the activity of the members of informbureau movement, but on their persecution, that’s why the theme of camps is most developed, where the sinister Naked Island stands out. However, here still are some blanks, as the union archival fund of the public security is still closed for the researchers. But much more unsolved problems containsanother question: what is the nature of the informbureau movement? Modest results, that were given by the Yugoslavian historiography will be the subject of this article.

Leaders of that Yugoslavian regime were first who tried to set this question. In January 1951, speaking at the session of the Political Bureau of the Communist party of Slovenia Central Committee, a member of Political Bureau Central Committee Communist party of Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas announced: “The problem of Informbureau movement in Slovenia is that there were not so many manifestations, so ideologically and politically it was underestimate. We need to fight against capitalistic bureaucracy steadily. All bureaucrats, who have their positions, are standing by the Informbureau movement. It is more dangerous, than petty-bourgeois elements.” [7, S.260].Right after that, the same estimation was announced and specified at the session of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Croatia. On 2 February member Politburo CC CPC Vladimir Bakarich declared, that Informbureau is dangerous because of the Yugoslavian retardation. It can easily follow the USSR’s way, which is far from socialism because of its backwardness. That’s why those, who are long ranging through the Informbureau, are the most dangerous enemies of the socialism construction. Thereupon, Bakarich urged to clean up the party: those, who are not able to conduct a new course, will be pensioned off, and wobblers and enemies will be polished off [8, S.635]. On 21 February, the member of Politburo CCPC Croatia ZvonkoBrkich confirmed Bakarich’s statements. He declared, that the core of the Informbureau’s followers consist of “different bureaucratic functionaries, who are the best members of Informbureau” [8, S.647].

The contemporary information about the social structure of the members of informbureau movement fits to these facts very well. Those statistics have not been published in corpore up to now. But according to the official figures, that R. Radon’ich cites as an example, among them were 5626 peasants, 5081 workers, 4008 students, 1722 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and University of Banking, 2616 staffers of the party apparatus, 550 heads of government bodies, including 63 deputies of the Union and the Republican Assemblies, 4153 Yugoslavian army’s employees [9, S.74].Thereupon certainly can be argued that the Informbureau movement is mainly urban and is largely spread in the party-state apparatus. The statistics in Slovenia and Macedonia prove this conclusion [6; 10, S.170, 171]. But it doesn’t mean, that estimates given in 1951 by Politburo CC CP Yugoslavia are fair.

First, the public change of point of view of Politburo CC CPY to the problems of socialism occurred only in 1950, and the peak activity of the members of informbureau movement falls on 1949, when CPY was still developing canonic Stalinist politics. That’s why we can’t perceive in members of informbureau movement bureaucratic renegades rising against true socialism. However it’s hard to deny the fact that since 1950 the new politic of the ruling party was able to put dogmatically minded staff into Informbureau members. But this fact didn’t work, when the movement just started. That’s why the main reason of its origin is in something else. Second, a high rate of repressed people in the party-state apparatus can be explained by the choice of punitive agencies, their priorities in repressive politics and the field of persecuting enemies. As a result, the Yugoslavian historiography didn’t come even close in its interpretation of informbureau movement to the level of Djilas, Bakarich and Brkich. It was disposed to argue in the official propaganda’s channel, established at the period of Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, and to show informbureau members’ activities just as a part of Stalin’s conspiracy against Yugoslavia [e.g.: 11, S.147, 159].

This point of view is rendered tribute even by such outstanding historian as Vladimir Dedier. He presented members of Informbureau movement as developed espionage net, that was created by Stalin before the Soviet-Yugoslavian conflict, and during the conflict it was pushed to battle against Yugoslavia [12, S.449].However, unlike his predecessors, Dedier tried to prove this point of view with a large amount of facts. He gathered oral testimonies and even got an access to documents that showed, that Informbureau members’ were working on the soviet special service. As those documents are still not available for analysis of the historians ,Dedier’sinformation takes on special significance. Thus briefly examine them.

In Deriner’s research we can find a description of five such cases [12, S.350, 461, 462, 464, 487].There are 54 people in the aggregate. The most significant is associated with a certain colonel V.D. Rijeke, who had created secret-service net, consisted of 28 persons, based on the Yugoslavian navy. He was executed for this. One more man (B. Cholich) wanted to set wiretapping of J. Brosa-Tito in summer 1948, but was caught and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. The rest three cases don’t cause the trust. 21 persons were arrested in the MFA on suspicion of their connection with Soviet agents, but Dedier says nothing about the proof of their guilt. Two generals, being incarcerated on the Naked Island pleaded themselves as Soviet agents, but this fact Deider transmitswith reliance onoralevidenceand noton the documents. But the thing is that rules on the Naked Island were so terrible, that the prisoners could accept whatever they were accusing of, so we can ignore their evidence. The list ends with M. Brashich, who provided invaluable services for the partisans movement during the war, and in 1948 was declared as Soviet agent. Notably, that Dedier provides no evidence unmasking him, and Brashich didn’t recognize himself guilty.

The list can be supplemented by the well-known case of two members CC CPY A.Hebrang and S.Zhujevich, who were arrested in spring 1948 as prospective Soviet agents. In neither case their fault was proved. Both accused were not brought to the court, although for different reasons. Herbrang had died in prison, whileZhujevich hadrepented for his political mistakes and was released.

If we will analyze all these examples, it turns out that none of them has an evidence of recruiting future members of Informbureau movement before the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict began. Perhaps, only Cholich could have been recruited in advance. But this is only one case with one man. Against the background of mass of the members of Informbureau movement it proves nothing. At the period of conflict Soviet secret service naturally tried to recruit to Informburo, and it would be strange, if they had not done it considering bitterness that accompanied the Soviet-Yugoslav confrontation. But even if we take the overall number of people, that Dedier thought were foreign agents, it is not comparable with the number of repressed people. Those, as we can see in the available data, were from 16288 to 16731, with the total amount taken on suspicion of 55663 people. In a word, the official version about members of informbureau movement as Soviet spies looks untenable.

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**Шахін Ю.В. Соціальна природа інформбюровського руху в югославській історіографії. – Стаття.**

**Анотація.** В статті розглядаються оцінки, які давали югославські історики інформбюровському руху. Простежена еволюція оцінок, показано, що версія про інформбюровців, як агентів радянських спецслужб необгрунтована. Останні дослідження показали, що інформбюровський рух став наслідком соціальних процесів в Югославії, а ступінь його розвитку залежав від національно-культурних особливостей окремих регіонів.

**Ключові слова:** Югославія, інформбюровці, соціальний склад, політична боротьба, історіографія.

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматриваются оценки, которые давали югославские историки информбюровскому движению. Прослежена эволюция оценок, показано, что версия об информбюровцах, как агентах советских спецслужб необоснованна. Последние исследования показали, что информбюровское движение стало следствием социальных процессов в Югославии, а на степень его развития зависела от национально-культурных особенностей отдельных регионов.

**Ключевые слова:** Югославия, информбюровцы, социальный состав, политическая борьба, историография.